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ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ROOSEVELT, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANIEL GILCHREST, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 960047-CA 
Category No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-2a-3 (2) (f). Defendant/Appellant appeals from a 
final Judgment entered in the Eighth Judicial District Court, 
Duchesne County on November 30, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON 
APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that the plaintiff 
could prosecute the defendant despite defendant's filing a Notice 
and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges? 
A trial court's conclusion of law in criminal cases are 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 
1993). Record page 28,48-54. 
2. Did the trial court correctly rule that a criminal 
conviction could be had upon the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice? 
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are 
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reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurmanf 846 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 
1993). Record Page 25. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Section 77-29-1 et seq. 
Utah Code Section 77-17-7 
Copies of these statutory provisions are attached to this 
Brief as an addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Gilchrest, filed a Notice and Request for 
Disposition of Pending Charges, dated March 20, 1995 with the DIO 
record unit at the Utah State Prison. Record page 8. It was 
apparently filed with the District Court on March 27, 1995. Record 
page 8. On April 13, 1995, the plaintiff filed an information 
charging the defendant with theft, a Class B Misdemeanor and 
Automobile Burglary, a Class A Misdemeanor, against the defendant. 
Record page 1. On July 31, 1995 the defendant made a Motion to 
Dismiss based on his filing for a 120 day disposition and trial not 
being held within 120 days of March 20, 1996. The Court denied 
defendants Motion. Record page 28. 
On August 9, 1995, the case was tried before the Court. The 
issue was raised whether the defendant could be convicted based on 
the testimony of an accomplice which was uncorroborated. Record 
page 29, 39, 40. Each of the parties filed memoranda and the Court 
ruled that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice would 
support a conviction and found the defendant guilty of Automobile 
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Burglary, a Class A Misdemeanor and Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
Record page 25. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
Jacob Quada was the first witness called by the State. Record 
Page 63. He testified that before Thanksgiving, 1994, he and 
Gilchrest went to a friend's house and he wasn't there. Record 
page 64-65. Gilchrest walked down the street, came back and drove 
around the corner from a dark car. Quada and Gilchrest got out of 
Mr. Gilchrest's vehicle, went back to the car, took some speakers 
out of the car and put them into Gilchrest's truck. Record pages 
65-67. About a week later, the defendant put the speakers in his 
car, took them to Heber and pawned them. Record page 68. 
A second witness called by the state was Paul J. Mitchell. 
Record page 81. Mr. Mitchell testified that he lived at 679 North 
400 East in Roosevelt. Record page 81. He testified that he owned 
a black 1983 Mercury Caprice and that in approximately August of 
19 94 he had two fifteen inch Rockford Phosgate speakers stolen. 
Transcript pages 81-83. 
The defendant did not testify. Record page 34. 
ARGUMENT 
This brief is filed pursuant to Anders v. State of California, 
87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967) and State v. Clayton, 639 P. 2d 168 (Utah 
1981). 
The first issue raised by Gilchrest is whether the Court was 
correct when it denied defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the 
trial being held more than 120 days after defendant filed a 
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detainer• The defendant's detainer was filed March 27, 1995 
(Record p. 8) and the information was filed on April 13, 1995. 
(Record P. 1). The trial was held on August 9, 1995. Record p. 
56, In Utah Code Section 77-29-1 (1) it states: 
Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of 
imprisonment in the state prison, jail or 
other penal or correctional institution of 
this state, and there is pending against the 
prisoner in this state any untried indictment 
or information, and the prisoner shall deliver 
to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the 
same, a written demand specifying the nature 
of the charge and the Court wherein it is 
pending and requesting disposition of the 
pending charge, he shall be entitled to have 
the charge brought to trial within 120 days of 
the date of delivery of written notice. 
When the defendant appeared in Court on July 31, 1995 to be 
arraigned, more than 120 days had passed from the date the 120 day 
detainer had been filed. 
The pertinent language of the statute as it is applied to this 
case is "and there is pending against the prisoner in this state 
any untried indictment or information." The Courts in this state 
have determined that a request that is made before an information 
is filed is premature and a nullity. 
In State v. Belcher, 475 P. 2d 60 (Utah 1970) the defendant 
filed a detainer on September 19, 1969. A preliminary hearing was 
held on November 20, 1969 and an information was filed on November 
26, 1969. The Court held that there was no way to dispose of the 
matter finally until the information was filed and that the request 
was premature. The defendant appealed asking that he be 
exonerated because he had not been tried within 90 days from the 
date of his request. The Court denied his request. 
In State v. Clark, 501 P. 2d 274 (Utah 1972) the Complaint was 
signed against the defendant on November 11, 1971. The defendant 
filed a detainer on November 15, 1971. A preliminary hearing was 
held on February 1, 1972 and nine (9) days later an information was 
filed. On February 24, 1972, the defendant moved for dismissal on 
the ground that more than 90 days had elapsed since he demanded 
trial. The Court granted the Motion. The State appealed and the 
Order of the trial judge was reversed. The Court held that the 
statute specifically limits the request to a situation where there 
is a pending untried information, indictment or complaint...This 
written demand was a nullity...we think the State has 90 days from 
notice after an information or indictment has been filed in which 
to bring the defendant to trial in a felony case. 
In State v. Farnsworth, 519 P. 2d 244 (Utah 1974) it is 
stated: 
His argument seems to be that after he files a 
demand, the statute requires that any 
accusation against him whatsoever, whether he 
had been charged with the crime or not, must 
be disposed of within the ninety days. What 
the statute says is that whenever during the 
term of imprisonment there is pending any 
untried indictment, information or complaint 
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to 
trial within ninety days after request for 
disposition. This statute plainly does not 
apply to any unfiled charge. If it did so, it 
would simply have the effect of giving the 
prisoner a ninety day statute of limitations 
upon any crime discovered or undiscovered, 
that he may have committed. The statute 
indicates no such intent and his contention is 
without merit. 
Counsel for Gilchrest has conducted research on Utah Code 
Section 77-29-1 and the cases decided thereunder and has found no 
support for the position advanced by Gilchrest. Counsel believes 
the first issue presented by Gilchrest is meritless* 
The second issue raised by Gilchrest is that he cannot be 
convicted based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
Utah Code Section 77-17-7 (1) states: 
A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice. 
In order for one to be an accomplice it must be shown that he 
knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent with the principal 
offender, united in the commission of a crime so that he could 
also be charged with the same offense. State v. Georgopoulos, 492 
P. 2d (Utah 1972). Quada was an accomplice in this case. Mr. 
Quada admitted that he helped take the speakers out of the car, 
took them down to Gilchrestfs truck and put them in the back of his 
pickup. Record p. 67. In State v. Smith, 706 P. 2d 1052 (Utah 
1985) the Court held that the defendants conviction could be had 
solely on the testimony of accomplices under Section 77-17-7 if the 
jury determined the testimony to be credible. The Court indicated 
in a footnote that numerous states have held that a conviction can 
be held on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
Gilchrest was tried to the Court which found him guilty based on 
the testimony of Quada. Counsel was unable to find any law which 
would invalidate Section 77-17-7. Therefore, counsel believes the 
second argument of Gilchrest is meritless. 
A copy of this brief will be mailed to Gilchrest as indicated 
in the mailing certificate attached hereto. 
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CONCLUSION 
Counsel files this brief under Anders
 f supra and Clayton r 
supra because after an examination of the case, he believes the 
appeal of Gilchrest lacks merit. 
DATED this Z *? day of October, 1996. 
JO&L D7 BERRETT 
A&corney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the day of October, 1996, I 
personally mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
to Clark Allred, Attorney for Plaintiff at 865 East 
200 North (112-10), Roosevelt, Utah and Daniel Gilchrest, 
Defendant, at c/o Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 
84020, by depositing the same, postage prepaid, in the United 
States Mail in Roosevelt, Utah. 
Jone Wells 
Secretary 
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ADDENDUM A 
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7 7 - 2 9 - 1 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Section Section 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers 77-29-9 Interstate agreement — Kucaprcl 
— Enactment into law — Text of prisoner while in tempouo 
agreement. custody. 
77-29-6. Interstate agreement — "Appro- 77-29-10. Interstate agreement — Dutj d 
priate court" defined. warden. 
77-29-7. Interstate agreement - Duty of 77.29-H Interstate agreement - Mian*? 
state agencies and political sub- general as administrator **d 
divisions to cooperate. information agent 
77-29-8. Interstate agreement — Applica-
tion of habitual criminal law. 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Contin-
uance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there U 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informs 
Lion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the chnrg* 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, HherifTor 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit* 
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion (w 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-1, e n a c t e d by L. Cross-References . — Right to speedy tfikl, 
1980, ch . 15, § 2. Utah Const., Art. I, § 12; § 77-1-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Dismissal with prejudice. 
Burden of compliance. Forfeiture. 
Commencement of period. G o o d c a u s e f o r continuance. 
Delay caused by codefendant's action. Good cause for failure 
Delay caused by prisoner. Premature request 
756 
7 7 - 1 7 - 6 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCKDUKK 
NOTKS TO DECISIONS 
Proof of c o r p o r a t e ex i s tence . of railroad company was that it was a corpor*. 
In prosecution for forger}', testimony that tion and transacted business as such. Sut<* v 
certain corporation was organized under laws Reese, 44 Utah 256, 140 V. 126 (1914). 
of Maine was incompetent to prove existence of In arson prosecution proof of corporate *u§< 
corporation, since this did not amount to proof tence of insurance company by policy of irmur* 
by reputation. State v. Brown, 33 Utah 109, 93 ance was insufficient, since policy was not an-
P. 52(1907). cient document (and thus self-proving), *n4 
Corporate existence of railroad company proof was required to be made. StnU? %; 
could be shown by proof that general reputation Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 (1933). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <s=» 567. 
77-17-6. Lottery tickets — Evidence. 
(1) On a trial for violation of any of the lottery provisions of the Utah 
Criminal Code, it is not necessary to prove: 
(a) The existence of any lottery in which any lottery tickets shall 
purport to have been issued; 
(h) The actual signing of any ticket or share, or pretended share of any 
pretended lottery; or 
(c) That any lottery ticket, share or interest was signed or issued by the 
authority of any manager, or of any person assuming to have authority m 
manager. 
(2) In all cases, proof of the sale, furnishing, bartering or procuring of any 
lottery ticket, share or interest therein, or of any instrument purporting to be 
a ticket, or part or share of any ticket shall be evidence that the share or 
interest was signed and issued according to its purport. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-6, e n a c t e d by L. Cross-References. -— lottery as "gambling* 
1980, ch . 15, § 2. within Criminal Code, § 76-10-1101. 
COLIJVTERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Lotteries § 22 ot seq. 
Key Numbers. — Lotteries «=» 29. 
77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice — In* 
struction to jury. 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accom* 
plice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given to 
the effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with caution, 
and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of 
the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable. 
His tory : C. 1953, 77-17-7, e n a c t e d by L. duct of another, § 76-2-202. 
1980, ch . 15, § 2. Discharging one of several defendant* U>U#* 
Cross-References . — Criminal responsibil- tify for state, § 77-17-2. 
ity for direct commission of offense or for con-
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JOEL D. BERRETT (0307) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
P.O. Box 26 2 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
(801) 722-3606 
FILED 
Utah Court of Apnea/s 
OCT 2 9 1996 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ROOSEVELT, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANIEL GILCHREST, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
Case No. 960047-CA 
COMES NOW the undersigned, and pursuant to Rule 3SA, Utah 
Rules of Appellant Procedure, moves the above entitled Court for an 
Order allowing him to withdraw as counsel for the appellant in this 
case, Daniel Gilchrest. 
This Motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that 
after an examination of this case, counsel believes the appeal of 
Gilchrest lacks merit and therefore requests permission to withdraw 
pursuant to State v. Clayton, 639 P. 2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
DATED this J^JS daY of October, 1996. 
t A&- £*4SA 
JOWL D. BERRETT 
^trorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the _^2X ^aY °^ October, 1995, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO WITHDRAW, 
to Clark Allred, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 865 East 200 North 
(112-10), Roosevelt, Utah 84066 and Daniel Gilchrest, c/o Utah 
State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, by depositing the 
same, postage prepaid, in the United States Post Office, Roosevelt, 
Utah. 
Jonej Wells 
Secretary 
